by less market activity and more female autonomy. In recent years, a more skeptical light has been cast on this nostalgic view by closer attention to how traditional, premarket institutions actually affected women's work and independence; this skepticism is borne out by evidence in the present study. '5 Early modem Bohemia provides an excellent context in which to test both the "technological" and "institutional" hypotheses. There was considerable economic variation across Bohemian rural communities after about 1550, with some concentrating on arable cultivation, others on animal husbandry, and others on rural industry and supplying urban markets. Institutions also varied, with different villages and estates characterized by a different balance of power between markets, landlords, and peasant communes. Finally, there was change over time, with the advance of the "second serfdom." Regional studies provide rich evidence that during the early modem period Bohemian landlords expanded demesne operations, increased labor rents and extended them to the rural substrata of smallholders and cottagers, levied new dues on protoindustry, set up market monopolies, regulated demographic choices, and curtailed serfs' legal rights.'6 Aspects of communal village administration were also strengthened, to ensure effective local enforcement of this heightened manorial pressure.17 The precise timing is debated, some claiming that Bohemia followed a Western trajectory until the Thirty Years' War (1 618-1648), while others argue that the decisive growth in landlord power took place during the sixteenth century or even earlier, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Recent research supports this latter view. '8 This article uses data for preindustrial Bohemia to explore women's position and the factors influencing it during this period. We first posit that in early modem Europe the incidence of households headed by women was a positive indicator of their economic and social position. Data are presented on female headship for Bohemia between 1381 and 1722, and compared with a dataset compiled for other European societies between 1400 and 1900. We then describe a unique and extraordinarily rich database covering 65 Bohemian villages between 1591 and 1722, and identify a set of hypotheses about the factors affecting female opportunities in poor economies that can be tested using these data. We then specify a regression model of the determinants of female headship, and compare the resulting estimates 15 See Hufton, "Women"; Bennett, "Medieval Women," especially pp. 153 (on the manor), 159-60 (on guilds); Quataert, "Shaping"; and Glickman, Ru.ssian Factory Women, for instance p. 56. 16 Hroch and Petran, 17. Jahrhundert; Klima, Economy; Cerman, "Gutsherrschaft"; and Cerman, "Proto-industrialisierung," pp. 81-149. 17 Ogilvie, "Staat. against the hypotheses. Finally, we explore manorial court records for direct evidence of the social pressures underlying our statistical findings.
HEADSHIP AS A MEASURE OF WOMEN'S POSITION
Before the advent of modem statistical records, women's economic position was rarely, if ever, documented in a manner amenable to quantification. One exception is the proportion of women recorded as household "heads." To begin, we must ask whether this statistic tells us anything interesting. It could be argued that female headship reflected not socioeconomic opportunity but demographic accident: the woman's lack, or loss, of a husband. But this ignores what we know from censuses and ethnographic studies. In preindustrial Europe, including Bohemia, a woman without a husband had several options. She could marry, or remarry. She could live with her parents. She could be a live-in servant. She could dwell as kin in a household headed by relatives. She could lodge as an inmate im a household of relatives or nonrelatives. She could enter a hospital, poorhouse, or other institution. Or she could maintain her own household. On the Bohemian estates of Fr~dlant and Liberec in 1651, for instance, there were 407 rural widows, of whom 1.5 percent lived in their parents' households, 2.5 percent worked as servants, 5 percent lived as coresident kin, 60 percent lived as inmates in households headed by kin or nonkin, and 30 percent headed their own households. 19 That is, the demographic event of losing (or lacking) a husband made a female-headed household possible; whether this possibility was realized depended on other factors.
But did a high female headship rate mean that women's position was good or bad? Or, to put the question differently, would a development that improved women's position have increased or decreased female headship? The literature harbors two schools of thought on this question. One argues that an improved economic and social position made women more attractive as marriage partners (or as other dependent household workers such as daughters, maidservants, resident relatives, or inmates), reducing the number left to head their own households. The other argues that improved economic and social opportunities expanded women's nonhousehold options, diminishing the attractiveness of marriage and other dependent household roles, and increasing female headship.20 The former view ignores female agency; the latter, male. Economic theory suggests that both forces should have operated: a factor that improved women's position would have increased the demand for women as marriage partners or household workers but, by improving women's outside options, would also have reduced the supply. Whether the demand or the supply effect predominated is theoretically indeterminate, and can only be resolved empirically.
Empirical findings do cast some light on this question. For one thing, in certain preindustrial European societies -among them Bohemia, as we shall see--some women insisted on maintaining independent households in the face of pressure to enter dependency as a wife, daughter, maid, relative, or inmate. In societies such as medieval and early modem England, periods of rising demand for female labor have also been identified as ones in which women delayed or avoided marriage because of favorable outside options.21 Such findings demonstrate that supply decisions were important: female household hea,ds were not simply those left behind once the demand for household dependents had been exhausted; they often chose this over other options.
A second set of fndings, which applies throughout Europe, suggests that factors improving female productivity reduced the supply of wives and other female dependents more than it increased the male demand for them, and hence increased female headship. Towns, with their specialization in industry, commerce, and service activities, had a much more intense demand for female workers than did the countryside, as shown by strong female inmigration and much higher ratios of women to men, both among servants and in the urban population at large. In theory, the higher female productivity in the urban economy could have decreased female headship by increasing male demand for female household workers, or increased it by reducing the supply of women willing to marry or work in dependent positions. In practice, however, female headship was significantly higher in towns than in villages, implying that high female productivity affected women's supply more than men's demand.22 These considerations support the view that, for preindustrial Europe at least, female headship can be interpreted as a positive indicator ofthe extent to which women were able and willing to manage an independent household, and thus of female options more generally.23
FEMALE HEADSHIP IN BOHEMIA AND EUROPE
A detailed comparative view of Bohemian households can be obtained from a 1651 religious census of some 400,000-500,000 people, about half the total population. A cooperative Czech-Austrian-British research project 21 Goldberg, Women; Sharpe, "Gender-specific Demographic Adjustment"; and Todd, "Remarrying Widow" and "Demographic Determinism."
22 Mittemuer, Familie, pp. 272-75; and Cerman, "Bohemia," pp. 159-60.
3 This view is consistent with that taken by Wall ("Women"), who points out that female headship is a key element of social structure, and that it has varied significantly across European societies; and by Humphries, who argues both that female headship played an important role in British industrialization ("Female-Headed Households," pp. 31-32, 51), and that women's position was worsened by welfare authorities' attempts to break up female-headed households under the New Poor Law (pp. 48-52).
has created a machine-readable database of this census for a sample of eight different estates, scattered throughout Bohemia and differing in ecological characteristics, economic specialization, history, and language. Together they encompassed more than 200 villages, comprising over 4,600 households and over 23,000 individuals. Concerns that the 1651 situation was atypical due to the Thirty Years' War, which had ended just a few years before, can be allayed through comparison with surviving censuses of 15 85/86 and 1 670-1 704, and with family reconstitutions from the eighteenth century; these reveal long-term continuities, particularly with regard to marriage patterns and female headship rates.24 The 1651 census, the only one enabling comparisons across settlements and regions, therefore provides insight into Bohemian family patterns over the longer period of the "second serfdom" between the sixteenth and the mid-eighteenth century.
It is evident from the 1651 census that the Bohemian "holding" (Stelle) was occupied by a coresident group that corresponded to the standard definition of the "houseful" (head, spouse, offspring, other kin, servants, and inmates), as analyzed in studies of family forms in the European past.25 A distinctive characteristic was the high proportion of inmates: on the estates of Frydlant and Liberec, for instance, 28 percent of all housefuls contained inmates. Many inmates were related to the household head, with 26 percent sharing the head's surname, and some explicitly described as kin. As a result partly ofthe system ofretirement contracts (vy.mme'nek, A usgedinge), whereby the new owner of a holding provided lodging to the previous owner's family, about 18 percent of households contained groups of two or more inmates who were related to one another. However, as inmate groups were not distinguished from the main household in any way save by their internal relationships, were described using the same term as individual inmates (podruh, Hausgenosse), and were sometimes mixed in with unrelated individual inmates, kin, and servants, they cannot reliably be identified as separate households, and thus are not included in the calculation of female headship rates. This approach also ensures comparability with other European societies, where inmate groups, however numerous, are not conventionally counted as separate households.
The characteristics of female-headed households in Bohemia can be elucidated on the basis of a detailed analysis of the 65 villages belonging to the estates of Frydlant and Liberec. In 1651 the approximately 10,000 inhabitants of these estates lived in 2,172 households, only 6 percent of them headed by females. All female heads were widowed (or, in a few cases, deserted by their spouses), compared to only 3 percent of male heads. This raises the question whether these low rates reflect a small number of very long-lasting female-headed households, or a larger number of shorter duration. Preindustrial sources are almost invariably cross-sectional in nature, and thus do not enable us to calculate the persistence of female households over time. However, demographic and epidemiological analysis of current-status data has shown that there is a stable proportional relationship between cross-sectional prevalence and average duration, and that in many situations the former is an excellent predictor of the latter.3" This is confirmed to some degree by Hermann Zeitlhofer's detailed micro-study of the south Bohemian parish of Kaplicky, which finds that in 1651 female-headed households were very rare, and that in the first decade of the eighteenth century they were extremely short-lived.32 These considerations suggest that the low prevalence of female-headed households in our eight estates also reflected a short average duration.
How representative was the Bohemian situation of that in preindustrial Europe at large? In isolation, such low percentages may seem normal. A farm not headed by a married couple is often portrayed as unviable, whether in actuality or in peasant mentalities, as reflected in the German tenn Rollenergdnzungszwang (the obligation that certain household niches always be filled).33 To test this hypothesis, we have compiled all available data on rural female headship rates across Europe, a total of 278 observations spanning the period 1427 to 1895, summarized by country and century in Table 2 . These show that Bohemian female headship rates were extraordinarily low. Female headship rates varied widely across preindustrial European villages, between zero and about 45 percent, but the average lay between 13 and 18 percent in each of the five centuries. First, it covers a large cross-section of villages at each date, making it possible not just to describe individual villages but to explore differences among them. Second, these four dates span a 131-year period, during which the "second serfdom" is viewed as having made its greatest inroads into Bohemian society; the data thus hold out some hope of identifying the effects of this historical process. Third, it combines demographic with socioeconomic and institutional variables, making it possible not just to describe familial and demographic behavior, but to examine explanations of it. Finally, detailed census information is available on these villages for one of the observation points-I 651-enabling us to check fiscal and manorial records of female headship against actual residence patterns. For no other preindustrial European society of which we are aware does there exist a database with these characteristics, ones which enable us to investigate the determinants of variations in female headship rates among communities and across time.
To analyze the influences on female headship using this database, it is necessary to formulate a general model of the determinants of female economic independence in poor societies, one that can be tested using the Bohemian data. Although no general theory of the determinants of female headship has ever been proposed, various hypotheses have been advanced about factors that increased or decreased female economic independence in preindustrial European societies. Hence a testable general model can be distilled from the literature.
A first set of explanations advanced in the literature focuses on endogenous demographic variables: female headship is high because the marriage rate is low (increasing spinsterhood), because the remarriage rate is low (increasing widowhood), because the age gap between spouses is wide (prolonging female widowhood), because the household system frowns upon extended families and inmates (so widows tend to live alone), because there are large numbers of coresident offspring of working age (compensating for loss of spousal labor), or because there is excess male emigration (reducing women' s marriage and remarriage prospects). But marriage, remarriage, 35This database was compiled by Sheilagh Ogilvie and Markus Cerman in the framework ofjoint research into the detenninants of variations in Bohemian social structure; the authors are grateful to Markus Cerman for perm-ission to use these data to examine female headship. spouse's age, residence, and migration are not exogenous influences on female headship. Rather, they are the results of choices made (subject to exogenous constraints) by women and men, just as female headship is: they are endogenous rather than exogenous variables. Therefore, these variables do not belong in a general model of female headship, unless one is ready to attempt the highly problematic exercise of trying to estimate a system of simultaneous equations to explain all of them at once.
Turning to genuinely exogenous explanations of female headship, one demographic variable remains: mortality. Female headship may be higher if overall mortality is low, increasing the number of older women from whom female heads may be predominantly recruited. Elderly persons (over age 60) were certainly fewer in Bohemia in 1585/86 and 1651 than elsewhere in preindustrial Europe, at less than 5 percent of the population compared to a typical 5 to 10 percent.36 But it is not the case that all female household heads were elderly: on the estates of Frydlant and Liberec, the youngest female heads were aged 29. More revealingly, the percentages of female household heads in each age group also appear to have been lower in Bohemia than in Western and Southern Europe." Thus Bohemia's low rates of female headship cannot be ascribed to a lack of elderly women.
A second mortality-related argument has greater importance. Female headship may be higher if male mortality exceeds female mortality, either overall or within marriageable age groups. Unfortunately, since only fragmentary parish registers survive from before 1700, no information on gender-specific mortality is available for the estates of Fr'dlant and Liberec. This variable cannot, therefore, be included in our testable model, and must be regarded as a component of the village-and period-specific fixed effects discussed in the next section.
"Technological" hypotheses hold that female independence was greater where the prevalent economic activities were those in which women's labor productivity was high relative to men's. As mentioned in the introduction, arable cultivation is regarded as unfavorable to women, because of its heavy physical demands and spatial incompatibility with household production. Conversely, pastoral agriculture is supposed to have favored women, since care of animals involved less heavy labor and less spatial separation from the dwelling.38 Protoindustry is also regarded as having enhanced female labor 36 productivity, because of its domestic location, its need for dexterity rather than strength, and the flexibility of combining it with other work.39 The last two characteristics also favored female productivity in small-scale trading and services, including laundry, sewing, processing and serving foodstuffs and beverages, and casual day-labor.40
For the estates of Frydlant and Liberec, data are available on a number of measures of the dominant economic activities in each village. The two main ecological determinants of arable productivity in early modem Europe were altitude and soil quality.4' In our testable general model we therefore include the village's mean altitude and the percentage of good and medium-quality land reported in 1722. Dependence on pastoralism is reflected in the ratio between pasture land and arable fields in 1722. The availability of two of these measures at only a single date is unfortunate, but even if the soil quality and pastoral-arable ratio changed over time (for example, as a result of soil exhaustion orprice changes), it seems reasonable to assume that differences among villages at any one time reflected stable underlying differences in resource endowments.
The effect of protoindustry on women would ideally be measured by spinning, in which female labor usually predominated. Finally, women's opportunities in small-scale trading and local services are likely to have been greater in larger villages with more differentiated patterns of demand (that is, in the ones more similar to small towns), so the model includes the number of holdings in the village. Such employments would also have emanated from urban markets, so the model includes the time required to walk from the village to the estate town, according to a nineteenth-century cosmography. ' A third set of hypotheses about the influences on female economic independence are "institutional," holding that women's position is chiefly For the estates of Frydlant and Liberec, there is no way to measure differences in the strength of communal institutions across villages, but also no evidence suggesting that such differences existed. There were, however, three measurable respects in which the strength of manorial institutions may have varied among villages. Some villages had demesne fanns, which implied not only the presence of a manorial official (the Vogt or demesne manager), but also greater incentives for manorial regulation of local labor and land markets. Second, some villages were fief-villages (Lehensd6rfer), ruled by minor fief-nobles rather than directly by the Counts of Frydlant, and hence subject to more intense manorial regulation of markets because of the local presence ofthe overlord. Third, the intensity of manorial regulation might have varied across estates, for example with the policies of different estate administrators: differences in personnel could matter, as shown by Steven Hoch's study of a nineteenth-century Russian estate, where family fissions among serfs proliferated under one lax bailiff, but were strictly prevented by his predecessor and successor.46 A final factor postulated as influencing female headship is social stratification: many studies have found that there were more female heads in lower social strata.47 Underlying this empirical association are four possible causal relationships, encompassing the "technological," "institutional," and "demographic" arguments. First, the "technological" view suggests that a large farm could not be efficiently farmed by a female head, who lacked the requisite strength, managerial skills, or complementary workers (and who was, presumably, unable to hire these on the labor market); smallholdings and cottager holdings, by contrast, could remain economically viable under female headship.48 Second, the "institutional" view argues that although larger holdings under female headship were economically viable, they were institutionally disadvantaged, either by markets or by communal and feudal authorities.49 Third, the "demographic" view argues that richer women were more attractive marriage partners, reducing their need to maintain independent households.50 Finally, the causation may be reversed, with female headship causing a previously richer farm or household to become poor (for example, because of family labor shortage or gender discrimination), rather than the poverty of the holding facilitating female headship.5"
The last two arguments can be excluded from consideration. The "demographic" view is simply a reprise of the notion that female headship is determined solely by men's demand for wives; as discussed above, women's supply also mattered, and richer women had better outside options, leaving the outcome indeterminate. For Bohemia, the fourth explanation can also be excluded, since the social stratum of a serf holding was defined exogenously, in terms of its land area (which was indivisible) and its fiscal and feudal liabilities. At the top were the "peasants" (Bauern), who held enough arable land to live entirely from farming, owed the highest feudal dues and state taxes, and had to perform labor services with draft animals. Beneath them was a stratum of smallholders (Gartner), who held some arable land but not enough to subsist on, owed lower dues and taxes, and rendered labor services by hand. The meanest independent holdings were those of cottagers (Hdusler), who held only their own cottages on the commons, owed some dues and taxes, and had to perform sporadic labor services on demand. Since social stratum in rural Bohemia was defined in terms ofthe arable area and fiscal liabilities ofthe landholding, not the personal characteristics (such as sex) of the holder, it was exogenous to female headship. We therefore include in our model the percentage of smallholders and cottagers in the village. This does not resolve the issue of whether any effect of social stratum on female headship emanated from "technological" or "institutional" sources. However, the qualitative data discussed in the last section of the article cast light on this question. ) ; and the percentage of smallholders and cottagers (whom we shall tenn collectively the "rural substrata"). From the database described above, it has proved possible to obtain complete information on all regression variables for 44 villages in 1591, 50 villages in 1651 and 1654, and 63 villages in 1722, yielding a total of 207 observations. The data available to estimate the model therefore take the form of an unbalanced panel. Because the dependent variable is by definition bounded between zero and 1 00 percent, it is appropriate to estimate a Tobit regression model by maximum likelihood. Of the 207 observations, 84 include no female-headed households; thus the feature of our data requiring a Tobit model is the left-censoring of the dependent variable at zero.52 Since six of the explanatory variables do not vary within villages across time, the general regression model cannot be estimated using the fixed-effects estimator for panel-data models. When the random-effects estimator is used, the estimated variance ofthe village-specific disturbance terms is negative, suggesting that the random-effects specification is inappropriate.53 As neither of these two standard specifications for a model to be estimated on panel data can be used, the general model is estimated on the full panel, with interactive variables included to test whether the effect of each explanatory variable on female headship was constant over time. The interactive variables are created by multiplying each explanatory variable by three different dummy variables relating to three of the years in which the variable was observed (1651, 1654, and 1722). These three dummies are themselves included, to allow for possible shifts over time in the intercept of the regression model. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report the results obtained using this method of estimation after the imposition of a number of zero restrictions on the general model, which results in the exclusion of seven of the ten explanatory variables (and the corresponding interactive variables), as well as the three shift dummy variables. The zero restrictions which result in the model in Table 3 are acceptable at the 5 percent level, according to a Wald test.
It is often at least as useful to reject hypotheses as to accept them. For this reason, some of the most informative results from our econometric analysis relate to those variables that were excluded from the model because they did not have any statistically significant effect, despite being widely theorized as influencing female economic independence. Five of the six "technological" variables included in the general model were rejected on these grounds. Women's low productivity in arable agriculture did not reduce female headship in Bohemia, since a village's soil quality and its altitude had no effect. Nor did pastoral agriculture or protoindustry apparently create opportunities for female independence, since neither the pastoral-arable ratio nor the share of households weaving linen had any significant impact. This is particularly striking given that in some villages one household in three paid a manorial licence fee for weaving linen in 1591, rising to two households in three in 1650 and 1722. Larger villages surely resembled towns in having more differentiated patterns of demand, but there is no evidence that this facilitated female headship there. It should be stressed that these "technological" factors may indeed have affected female labor productivity; but if so, then the more productive women remained in dependent household roles (as wives, daughters, maids, kin, and inmates) rather than, as in towns throughout Europe (including Bohemia), taking advantage of their wider options to maintain independent households."4 The fact that these 65 Bohemian villages varied so widely in their economic characteristics (which were exceptionally well-recorded by preindustrial standards), and yet almost none of these characteristics affected female headship, suggests that other factors were at work in Bohemian rural society which prevented higher female productivity from giving rise to more female-headed households.
Only one "technological" characteristic significantly affected female headship, and then only in 1591. As can be seen from Column 3 of Table 3 , proximity to a town increased female headship in 1591, a result consistent with the theoretical prediction that opportunities in small-scale trading and services, in which women were relatively productive, were greater in villages located closer to urban markets, with their pool of richer customers and their more differentiated patterns of demand. This effect was quite large, especially relative to the low overall female headship rate: computed at the sample means, the marginal effect of a village's being one hour's walk nearer to the town was that its female headship rate was two percentage points higher. But the estimated effects of distance on female headship in 1651, 1654, and 1722 were not significantly different from zero. This finding suggests that while in the sixteenth century influences emanating from the towns into the surrounding countryside created openings for female economic independence, pressures at work in seventeenth-century Bohemian society eventually closed these opportunities.
Village social structure, a second variable affecting female headship, may be interpreted as either "technological" or "institutional." As shown in Column 3 of Table 3 , the estimated effect of the percentage of smallholders and cottagers (the rural substrata) on female headship is positive and significantly different from zero at conventional levels for 1591 and 1651; it is not significantly different from zero for 1654; and it is significant only at the 8.4 percent level for 1722. On the whole, the positive estimated effect for three of the four years of observation suggests that a greater predominance of the rural substrata structure did encourage higher female headship in Bohemian villages, although we do not know whether this was because female heads were more economically viable on smallholdings and cottager holdings, or because theywere less subject to institutional pressures there. Furthermore, although a predominance of rural substrata did significantly encourage female headship in 1651 and 1722, the size of its effect was significantly smaller than in 1591. This suggests that the openings created for female headship by a larger rural substratum, as by proximity to towns, declined between the late sixteenth and the early eighteenth centuries. Possible reasons for this are revealed by the qualitative evidence discussed later.
The econometric estimation also sheds useful light-both negative and positive-on "institutional" explanations for female economic independence, at least as they apply to Bohemia. One "institutional" hypothesis is rejected by the regression results: that villages with demesne farms or administered by fief-nobles, and hence with stronger manorial institutions regulating the allocation of land and labor, created a "traditional" or "nonmarket" institutional environment in which female headship flourished. It may still be the case that such villages were characterized less by the "market economy" and more by the "traditional economy," but this did not create significant openings for female economic independence.
The third "institutional" variable, the feudal estate to which the village was subject, did have an impact on female headship. As shown in Column 3 of Table 3 , its effect was not significantly different from zero in 1591 or 165 1, but was negative and significantly different from zero at conventional levels in 1654, and at the 5.6 percent level in 1722. The effect was also quite large: computed at the sample means, female headship was approximately two percentage points lower in 1654 and 1722 if a village was subject to the estate of Frydlant rather than Liberec. Interpreting this finding is not straightforward, especially since the variable sprang to significance in the three-year gap between 1651 and 1654. The difference between the two estates was not caused by village characteristics included in the general model, since these are controlled for in the regression. It may reside in unmeasured ecological, socioeconomic, or demographic characteristics (such as gender-specific mortality) excluded from the model. It may also be linked to differences in manorial administration since the two estates, though owned by the same landlord, were run by different officials. The most likely explanation, however, is that ESTATE suddenly became important between 1651 and 1654 because the mass emigration of those years created unprecedented administrative and fiscal challenges for overlords, to which different manorial officials devised differing responses. Any adult reported as nonCatholic in the 1651 religious census was ordered to convert or leave the country. The resulting emigration (estimated at 15 percent of the Bohemian population) affected our two estates differently: by 1654, half of all Fry'dlant holdings lay abandoned, compared to only 7 percent of Liberec holdings. As late as 1722, Fry'dlant still had more abandoned holdings than Liberec. Although one might expect abandonment to open more positions for women, as in other European societies during demographic crises, here it was the opposite: controlling for other village characteristics, the share of deserted holdings in a village in 1654 was negatively related to its female headship rate.55 The Liberec administrators may have been more liberal toward female heads because they regarded their less devastated villages as better able (or perhaps more willing) to bear the fiscal risks of having households headed by women-who, as we shall see in the next section, were not regarded as "full holders." Whatever the underlying cause, subjection to one estate rather than another emerges as a major determinant of female headship in these Bohemian villages after 165 1, even as proximity to town and the predominance of rural substrata were affecting it less.
The effect of proximity to the town disappeared after 1591, the effect of larger rural substrata declined after 1591, and the effect of estate emerged only after 165 1. This raises the possibility of change over time, an important question given the "institutional" hypothesis that a transition from "traditional" to "market" institutions pushes women out of independent positions and back into domestic dependency. The period from 1591 to 1722 encompasses much ofthe Bohemian "second serfdom," during which nascent rural markets were displaced by resurgent manorial institutions. If the "institutional" hypothesis is correct, one would expect this period to have been characterized by a resurgence in the female economic independence that nascent markets had begun to crush. Did female headship rates in these Bohemian villages change over time, independently of any changes in the explanatory variables? This question may be addressed by estimating a Tobit regression model with fixed village-and time-effects. Such a specification has the incidental advantage that, to the extent that there were village-or " A Tobit regression of female headship in the 50 villages observed in 1654, on all .ten variables used in the analysis for Table 3 plus the percentage of abandoned holdings, yields an estimated coefficient on thepercentageofabandoned holdings of -0.288 (with a t-statistic of -2.048, indicating significance at the 5 percent level). time-specific effects on female headship that we have wrongly omitted from the regression model because we cannot measure them (gender-specific mortality, for instance), it will provide better estimates of the effects of those variables which were included and which vary within villages across time. The estimates of the effects of these variables resulting from this specification are very similar to those provided by the previous estimation procedure, suggesting that there is no omitted-variable bias in these estimates.56 Furthermore, this specification yields estimated time-specific effects for 1654 and 1722 that are significantly smaller than those for 1591 and 1651, indicating that female headship was lower after 1651 than before, for reasons independent of the village characteristics included as explanatory variables in the regression analysis. This result flatly contradicts the most widely held "institutional" hypothesis, according to which women had better economic opportunities under traditional than under market institutions. In Bohemia, the period during which market institutions contracted and traditional institutions recovered their strength was characterized by a fall, not a rise, in female economic independence.
Our econometric findings can be summarized as follows. There is no evidence that female headship in rural northern Bohemia between the late sixteenth and the early eighteenth centuries was affected by most of the "technological" factors generally regarded as influencing women's economic independence in preindustrial Europe. Proximity to urban markets does appear to have created opportunities for female independence in 1591, but these opportunities disappeared thereafter. A larger rural substratum did increase female headship (whether for technological or institutional reasons), although its effect diminished between 1591 and 1722. In the same period, for reasons which are not (yet) wholly clear, subjection to one feudal estate rather than another emerged as an important influence on female headship. Finally, for reasons unrelated to other measurable village characteristics, the incidence offemale-headed households declined over the period associated with the most important set of institutional changes to affect early modern Eastern Europe, namely the replacement of markets by strong manorial institutions under the "second serfdom."
SOCIAL PRESSURES ON FEMALE HEADSHIP
The quantitative findings make a circumstantial case that the advance of the "second serfdom" was associated with a decline in female headship and may therefore have adversely affected women's economic position in rural Bohemia. But what were the precise conduits by which the growth in manorial power and communal regulation could have influenced female headship? Qualitative sources can provide direct evidence bearing on this question. Although Bohemian village courts kept no records other than land transfers, the next higher jurisdiction, the manorial court (Amt), often did. Surviving records from the Amt of Frydlant, for example, which cover scattered periods between 1583 and 1692, reveal that manorial officials regarded female heads as likely to default on rents, labor services, and state taxes (which landlords were responsible for collecting), and to reduce future rents by incurring debts and neglecting farm maintenance. In 1604, for instance, a widow in Horni Visnova' (Oberweigsdorf) who claimed "that she had been keeping the farm in her children's best interests until she could provide for her children" was ordered to "provide the farm with a capable holder [tiuchtigen Wirt], sell it, or marry off the daughter, within a year and a day."57 A year later, she was "granted as a favor in the manorial court, that she may retain her farm, on condition of no ruination to the fields, pastures and woods, for her eldest daughter, until the latter is betrothed, either until Whitsun or at latest until Martinsmas this year."58 In 1606, a widow from Bily' Potok (Weil3bach) was granted penmission to retain her cottager holding until she remarried, "in the best interests ofthe children," but was threatened with penalties "if in the meantime she shall reduce anything on the holding or incur more debts."59 In 1609, a peasant's deserted wife tried to contract privately with neighbors to sow her barley and herd her cows, but the manorial court ordered that "the village elders shall look out for a good holder [guten Wirt] and a young man, and set him into the farm so that it may be maintained in a cultivable state ... the horses shall remain with the village court so that the pastor9s labor rents may be rendered."60 In 1685, the court ordered a widow in Heimanice (Hermsdorf) to pay all feudal dues and military contributions, or else her cottager holding "shall be sold and a full holder [volliger Wirt] be secured for it."6" Even a woman of the local fiefnobility had to petition the manorial court in 1650 to be "granted the favor of being allowed to cultivate and set right the fann of Tschemhausen"; although she promised to import cattle and not diminish the arable fields, the court ordered that a male purchaser (Kaufinann) be found within six weeks "to prevent further complete ruination of the fief and the interests the overlord has resting on it."62 Manorial officials thus sought to replace female heads because they did not regard them as "capable," "good," or "full" holders. Whether they were justified in taking this view is a question we shall discuss shortly.
To get rid of female heads, the landlord's officials made a practice not only of ordering them to sell up or marry, but also of intervening in the terms of land transfers. Among these were retirement contracts, important pieces of property in their own right, which affected the price of the holdings to which they were attached and which changed hands for substantial sums.63 In October 1650, for instance, the manorial court ordered that a retired peasant widow in Raspenava (Raspenau) should henceforth be allowed to use only one field and a small excess plot, while "the remainder of the retirement contract shall be altogether abolished." The explicit purpose was to enable her widowed daughter-in-law "the sooner to secure a [male] purchaser for the farm."64 Careful reading of the records, however, suggests that straightforward profit-maximization was not the only motive behind landlord pressure on women heading households. In many cases, female heads were reported to the court by village elders, who sought to manipulate seigneurial decisions for their own ends. That is, the landlord's power to dissolve serf households and intervene in land transfers opened up the prospect of economic rents for various third parties, and hence created an incentive to engage in rent-seeking by persuading the manorial officials that a female-headed household was harming seigneurial interests. In 1645, for instance, one HanB3 Hubner's widow complained that "the community wanted to sell her farm for 6 Schockl"; the manorial officials accepted the decision of the village court, despite the revelation that the proposed male purchaser was so poor that the community would have to grant him a year's freedom from taxes and manorial burdens.65 In 1685, the "village court and community" of Hermanice (Hermsdorf) complained to the Fr'dlant manorial court that Anna, Jacob Schmied's widow; "wishes to pay very little from her cottager holding on the commons." The estate captain ordered that if she failed to pay up, "the holding shall be sold and a full holder obtained for it."66 That same year, the village of Horn kasnice (Bernsdorf) reported Rosina, Hans March's widow, for fornication with another villager; the court ordered that "Hans Apelt with his wife shall move into the cottage with his daughter, the said Rosina, in order to prevent further whoring."67 From the perspective of the better-off males who dominated community offlces, it was never advantageous for their village to contain independent female heads-of-household, whom they regarded as poor and sexually unruly. This was the case throughout preindustrial Europe; the difference in societies under the "second serfdom," such as Bohemia, was that institu- 63 tional powers existed, and could be manipulated, to make it possible to get rid of female household heads rather than merely regretting their existence. 68 Male relatives, too, tried to use the landlord's powers to dislodge female heads. The prime mover in a series of attempts to eject "Old Widow Teschner" (die alte Teschnerin) from her farm in Horni Vi'snova (Oberweigsdorf) between 1604 and 1607 was her son-in-law Gorge Doring, who went so far as to submit a written petition against her. Doring persuaded the court to order that the widow sell out or otherwise "equip the fann with a capable holder," and that "the village bailiff and elders shall from now on inspect the exterior of the farm." He also achieved his main aim, to compel her to pay the remaining inheritance share due him on behalf of his wife.69 Likewise, Georg Krause's widow in Bilyr Potok (WeiBbach) was only brought to the attention of the manorial officials when her husband's brother Hans tried to dislodge her from the house and smallholding in 1606. Although unable to persuade the court to eject her outright, Hans succeeded in having her tenure declared strictly temporary and conditional: she might keep it only until Michaelmas, at which point she was to remarry, and her husband to apply to purchase the farm. Moreover, should Hans "find that she is keeping house poorly, he shall report it to the court, whereupon it shall be inspected by the village bailiff and elders." Hans had undoubtedly improved his chances of getting his hands on the holding by reporting his brother's widow to the landlord's officials.70 In 1645 Gtorg Hiubner actually succeeded in usurping his widowed sister-in-law's holding, by persuading the community and then the manorial officials "that the surviving widow cannot manage this farm, let alone pay the debts," and bypromising-in the teeth of her furious protests and written petition to the lord-to compensate her with two cartloads of hay, half of that year's grain, and the farm's cows.71
It might be argued that these cases do not reflect the position of women in Bohemia, but rather the nature of inheritance custom and the manorial system. It could be held that the manorial court was merely enforcing North Bohemian inheritance practice, which favored the rights of orphans over those of widows, who were regarded as temporary trustees for their offspring.72 But gender was clearly an important criterion in the manorial officials' choice of a temporary holder, and it is hard to judge whether this reflected the best interests of the orphans or of the landlord. On no occasion did the Frydlant court order a widow's second husband or son-in-law in temporary tenure, of the farm during the rearing of minor heirs to sell up on the grounds that he was not a "capable" holder. Quite the contrary: the court oversaw the sale of one farm in Detfichovec (Dittersbachel) in 1688 for 80 Schock, "although it would otherwise have been worth quite a lot more, and could have been sold for a higher price," because the buyer had agreed to marry the widow, pay the farm's debts, and rear the orphans as his own children.73 By underpricing the farm so as to get a male holder for it, were the manorial officials defending the interests of the orphans, or those of the landlord? Likewise, it might be argued that dissolution of female-headed households had nothing to do with gender, since Bohemian landlords could order any unsatisfactory serf, male or female, to vacate a holding: this was merely part of the regional manorial system. But careful analysis shows that gender did play a role. From the surviving manorial court records, which provide scattered coverage of court business for 67 of the 109 years between 1583 and 1692, 53 cases of threatened or actual ejection from holdings have been found.74 The proportion of females among those ejected was 15.0 percent, significantly higher than the 4.0 percent female heads for the years 1591, 1651, 1654, and 1722 combined, and more than double the 6.2 percent for 1651, the highest in any one year.75 Likewise, although numbers are too small for statistical significance tests, the justification given for ejecting a householder also appears to have differed by sex. Nearly 40 percent of all males ejected stood accused of serious offences: resisting labor dues, disobeying the lord, fraud in office, outright rebellion, or severe and repeated conflict with kin, neighbors, or the village as a whole. No female heads were ejected for such serious offences. Conversely, debt and economic difficulties accounted for only 36 percent of male heads ejected, but fully 62 percent of female ones. Strikingly, no grounds whatsoever were given for ejection in 25 percent of cases involving females, but only 1 1 percent involving males. To eject a female head, it was enough simply to assert that she was not a "full" or "capable" holder. In principle, Bohemian landlords could eject any household head, but in practice women were likelier to be evicted for lesser transgressions-or for no stated reason at all. This raises the question of who was right: the female heads themselves, who clearly thought their households were worth maintaining, or landlords, communes, and male relatives, who argued that they were not. Surely a farm 7 SOA D6in, HS, 2. cAst, pobatky (Frydlant) d. 11, 20 Jan. 1688, fol. 32v-33r. 7 These volumes contain more than 3,100 separate cases, and are the subject of a wider research project by Sheilagh Ogilvie; but internal evidence shows that they do not record all business of the court even for the 67 years covered (1583-1592, 1593-1610, 1604-1606, 1609-1611, 1611-1616,  1615-1616, 1616-1619, 1627, 1629-1630, 1630-1631, 1645, 1649-1655, 1650-1651, 1655-1656,  1656-1660, 1661-1664, 1685-1687, and 1687-1692) . 75 Both differences are significant at the 5 percent level.
not headed by a married couple was headed for disaster in any case, and it was fortunate that these stubborn women were protected from their own folly by rational, profit-maximizing manorial administrators and the wise guidance of community elders? There are several arguments against this view. First, it is inaccurate to assume that female-headed households lacked male labor: in 165 1, only 27 percent of female-headed households lacked males altogether. Even those households that did lack adult males did not rely solely on the labor of their own members: Bohemian rural society contained large numbers of cottagers and houseless inmates who survived partly by hiring out family members as laborers; it was a widespread practice for those with full peasant holdings to hire members of the rural substrata to work on their holdings, and even to carry out their manorial labor services. Third, smallholdings had little arable land to till, and cottager holdings none at all, which reduced or obviated the need for adult male labor; such holdings relied on other work such as protoindustry, rural crafts, and petty trading, in which women and children were relatively productive. Fourth, there is the fact that rural settlements elsewhere in Europe sustained a much higher proportion of female-headed households, even in regions characterized by much less nonagricultural activity than highly protoindustrialized northern Bohemia; the preindustrial European rural economy was capable of sustaining more female-headed households than were permitted to exist in Bohemia. Even in societies in which landlords and communes held views similar to those expressed in Bohemia, their lack of institutional powers meant that female headship rates were higher.76 Finally, there is the problem of explaining away women's own revealed preferences: we have no better grounds for believing that these women were irrationally optimistic in assessing their own economic viability than we have for believing that the landlords were irrationally pessimistic; indeed, one would expect the women themselves to have possessed better information than the manorial officials about their own capacities. This apparent contradiction can be resolved by recognizing that female heads, landlords, communes, and male relatives had different interests and different information. They may all have been rational, but in pursuit of different ends. The women themselves preferred not to enter a dependent situation in a household headed by a male, and to keep their farm for their minor offspring. In return for these benefits, they were willing to accept higher risks, especially since, at a pinch, households too poor to pay taxes and dues were perforce supported by their communities or even forgiven their debts by the landlord, and since a few years of poor farm maintenance could be set right by the inheriting offspring. The manorial officials, by 76 See, for instance, the similar attitudes but higher female headship for western Finland in Moring, "Family Strategies," pp. 70-72; and for rural Salzburg in Eder, Geschlechterproportion, pp. 126, 246. contrast, did not personally enjoy these benefits, and indeed incurred personal costs if they failed to collect revenues efficiently or endangered a delicate sociopolitical balance by provoking the more substantial members of rural society. The latter, who administered the communes, bore some personal liability when any of their economically marginal neighbors defaulted on taxes and dues. Moreover, as in Western Europe, they preferred specifically to exclude female heads, who might demand charity or prove sexually disruptive. Likewise, the brother-in-law or son-in-law of a widow had no reason to share her preference for independence or protecting her children's inheritance; his interest was in getting his hands on the farm or ensuring payment of his wife's inheritance share. Moreover, it is well known from economic studies of discrimination that, given imperfect information, gender (like ethnicity) can function as a screening device: if on average more female than male heads default on taxes, run down farm infrastructure, ask for neighbors' charity, or commit adultery, then even those female heads who would not do these things are expected to do so by other economic agents and, if institutional powers exist and can be manipulated to get rid of female heads, they may be used-even against women who would not in fact impose any of these costs on others.77 Within the Bohemian institutional system, the interests and perceptions of manorial administrators, communal officeholders, and male relatives dominated those of women themselves.
Direct evidence from court records thus helps us to interpret the circumstantial findings from regression analysis, which suggested that the "second serfdom"-by suffocating market developments, increasing fiscal pressures on villagers, and enhancing manorial power-adversely affected women's position. This circumstantial case is borne out by a variety of other evidence. It is consistent with local and regional studies showing that the period under analysis saw an expansion of landlords' regulatory powers and their fiscal incentives to extend regulation to the rural substrata. It is also borne out by direct evidence from the Frydlant manorial court records, which shows that manorial officials did eject serf householders, and that female heads were targeted disproportionately. Taken together, these facts may explain why, between 1591 and 1722, female headship declined significantly and responded less positively (if at all) to factors such as proximity to urban markets or a relatively large rural substratum. They may also explain why subjection to one feudal estate rather than another emerged as a major influence on female-headed households, as their survival depended more heavily on the discretion of manorial officials.
The fiscal motives for ejecting female heads revealed by the court records help explain why female headship was more common among the fiscally less important rural substrata. Yet the presence of smallholders and cottagers among cases of ejected householders explains why, by European standards, even the rural substrata had very low female headship rates in Bohemia. Case numbers are too small to test whether the share of smallholders and cottagers among ejected householders rose over time, but if this were so it would explain why the gap in female headship rates between peasants and the rural substrata narrowed between 1591 and 1722. Finally, rent-seeking aggression against female heads by communities and male relatives helps explain how landlords were able to exert such thoroughgoing pressure. The "second serfdom" operated not merely through direct monitoring by manorial officials, but also through collaboration by serfs themselves, who sought to use seigneurial powers for their own ends.
CONCLUSION
Little is yet known about women's position in those early modem Eastern European societies that underwent not the "transition to capitalism" experienced in the West, but rather the intensification of landlord powers under the "second serfdom." This is an important lacuna, given the widely held view that women's economic independence was impaired by the growth of the market economy and, conversely, furthered by the maintenance ofthe family economy within a framework of traditional nonmarket institutions.
Our investigation of women's position in Bohemia under the "second serfdom" focuses on female household headship, which it argues to be a good indicator of women's economic and social options. Female headship rates in rural Bohemia were extremely low by European standards between 1381 and 1591, and declined still further between 1591 and 1722. Whereas in the later sixteenth century proximity to urban markets and larger rural substrata created openings for independent female heads, during the seventeenth century various pressures caused these opportunities to contract or disappear altogether. That these pressures were primarily institutional in nature is indicated by the fact that, after 165 1, it began to matter greatly to which estate a given village was subject.
Qualitative evidence helps to explain these patterns. By the late sixteenth century, at latest, landlords had the power to regulate who could head rural holdings. Motives of profit-maximization led manorial officials to eject female household heads, who were regarded as poor fiscal risks. But that was not all. The landlord's power to regulate headship also constituted a source of economic rents, control of which was sought by other serfs. Village communities pursued the interests of better-off members by seeking seigneurial sanctions against female heads, whom they regarded as sexually disruptive and fiscally unreliable. Male relatives reported widows as "incapable holders," hoping thereby to obtain control of their holdings or to force payment of inheritance shares. Manorial officials had an interest in satisfying the more substantial elements of rural society, since even the "second serfdom" could not function without cooperation from the serfs themselves. Any favor that the landlord could costlessly grant to communes or influential individuals was a good political investment, given the ever-present threat of peasant revolt.
The power of Bohemian landlords to eject undesirable householders was only one aspect ofthe "second serfdom," just as independent household headship was only one among women's options. But our findigs suggest that this landlord power, and its manipulation by village communes and male individuals, was decisive in constraining the options of women, to a degree even greater than that experienced by women in most other parts of preindustrial Europe. Whatever may have been the impact of markets on women, in Bohemia neither the feudal system nor the village commune created an institutional framework tiat favored female economic independence.
